To discourage the emergence of splinter parties, jurisdictions using this system sometimes set a vote threshold that parties must obtain in order to qualify for seats. After a party's share of the available seats has been determined, it must be decided which candidates on its list will be declared elected.
In most jurisdictions this depends on the order in which candidates' names appear. Those whose names appear at the top of their party's list of candidates thus have the best chance of being elected, those at the bottom, the least. List systems have been criticized because they place considerable power in the hands of political parties, since they determine the order in which candidates names appear on the ballot and thus which candidates are most likely to assume office.
As a consequence, voters are deprived of a significant degree of choice and the ballot itself is rendered less meaningful. In order to redress this imbalance, some jurisdictions that use a list system allow electors a greater degree of choice among the candidates. This variation on the party list system can take two forms.
Under the first, voters have a choice among candidates, but they must be from one party alone. Under the second form, known as panachage used in Switzerland , voters are permitted to make their choices regardless of party. The basic principles of the party list system are still operative, however: parties are allocated seats on the basis of the popular vote they receive.
Seat Allocation. In all PR systems, there has to be some means of determining the allocation of seats among those contesting the election. Table 4 provides a overview of these methods. Under this system, the first step is to set the quota or threshold of votes that each party must attain to win a seat.
The vote for each party is then divided by the electoral quota. The simplest method of establishing a quota the "Hare quota" functions as follows: the number of votes cast is divided by the number of seats to be filled. For example, in a constituency where five seats are to be filled, and 40, votes are cast, the quota would be 8, votes. There are three other options that can be used. Under the "Hagenbach-Bischoff quota," the number of votes cast is divided by the number of seats to be filled plus one.
When the "Droop quota" is used, the number of votes cast is divided by the number of seats plus one and one is added to the quotient. The "Imperiali quota," used in Italy, divides the number of votes cast by the number of seats plus two. Subsequently, a seat is awarded to each party for each bloc of votes equal to the quota. For example, if a Hare quota has been set at 5, votes, each party will be given one seat for each bloc of 5, votes that it has received.
In a second step, any remaining seats to be allocated are awarded on the basis of which party or parties have the highest number of votes remaining after the quotas have been used up. Table 1 illustrates how this works. Four-member constituency, 20, votes cast Hare quota: 5, TOTAL 8, As the table shows, only parties A and B achieve the electoral quota and, as a result, only two of the four seats can be directly allocated. In the second step, the third seat goes to party A, since it has the largest number of votes remaining after the quota has been used.
The party with the second-largest number of remainder votes, party C, is awarded the fourth and final seat. The largest remainder system is known to reward smaller parties; here, party C wins as many seats as party B, though it received only half as many votes. The highest average system divides each party's votes by successive divisors and then allocates seats to the parties in descending order of the quotients.
Table 2 shows the same results as Table 1 but using the d'Hondt highest average system to allocate the seats. Four-member constituency, 20, votes cast division by d'Hondt divisors. In this example, the number of votes received by each party is successively divided by d'Hondt divisors 1,2,3. Seats are allocated once the use of all the divisors has been completed; in this way it is possible to compare the quotients and allocate the seats on the basis of their descending order.
Party A, with the highest quotient of 8,, is awarded the first seat; its third-highest quotient of 4, gives it the third seat as well. Party B's second highest quotient of 6, gives it the second seat and its quotient of 3, gives it the fourth, and last, seat.
It is clear from this example that the d'Hondt system tends to award seats to parties that receive the largest share of the votes cast, a factor which indicates that this system does not provide a large measure of proportionality.
A modified version of this system is used in several Scandinavian countries and involves setting the first divisor at 1. This tends to favour medium-sized parties in a multi-party system. It is possible to combine features of largest remainder and highest average systems by allocating seats using the Hare quota and d'Hondt divisors.
In the initial stage, the quota is applied; remaining seats are then allocated through the use of the divisors. In contrast to party list systems, STV systems emphasize the individual candidate rather than the party.
As is the case in all PR systems, electoral districts using STV are represented by several members in an assembly. Voters are asked to rank-order their choices among the candidates whose names appear on the ballot. When the ballots are counted, the first step is sorting them according to the first choices. In order to be declared elected, a candidate must obtain a certain threshold of the votes cast.
Those candidates who obtain the threshold during the first stage of counting are declared elected and any votes they have received in excess of the threshold are redistributed according to the second choices as marked.
The second stage of counting involves the redistribution of these "surplus" ballots; once more, those candidates achieving the threshold are declared elected and any surplus votes redistributed.
This process continues until all vacant seats have been filled. A hypothetical case shows how the STV system, using a Droop quota, works. If a 3-member electoral district had 1, voters, the number of votes required to win would be. Three-member constituency, 1, votes cast, five candidates, STV system. Z Table 3 shows how the votes would be tallied. At the first count, candidate D obtained the threshold of votes, was declared elected and had his or her 19 surplus votes redistributed.
These surplus votes were redistributed according to the second choices marked on them, giving the new totals, which appear in the second count column. On the fourth count, A's surplus ballot's were redistributed, giving E the necessary threshold. Thus after three redistributions and four counts, the three seats were filled by candidates A, D and E. It is noteworthy that candidate B, who received the second highest number of first preference votes, was not elected in the final outcome.
In Australia, voters are now offered a choice on their ballots between choosing a party list or ranking preferences among multiple candidates. Some jurisdictions have chosen to use a mixture of majority and proportional representation systems in order to achieve the benefits of both.
Since the late s in Germany, for example, one half of the seats in the Bundestag the lower house of parliament have been filled by plurality, using single-member constituencies, while the other half are filled using party lists, according to the d'Hondt system.
Voters mark two choices on their ballot papers: one from among a list of parties, the other from among a slate of candidates for district representation.
In summary, when largest remainder systems are used, quotas establish a threshold of votes that parties must attain to become eligible for seats in multi-member electoral districts. When highest average systems are used, divisors provide a means of allocating seats among the parties. Sometimes the two systems are combined so that quotas are used in the first stage and divisors are used to determine subsequent allocations.
No electoral system is perfect; each has its advantages and disadvantages of which the careful observer should be aware. This section of the paper summarizes the arguments made by proponents and critics of the various systems. It is helpful to remember that these arguments are sometimes polemical; an objective effort to assess each system on its merits is therefore worthwhile.
We should ask whether or not given electoral systems are effective in achieving certain desired outcomes. One scholar has suggested that elections in representative democracies should ideally accomplish the following goals:. One might ask, as well, whether a give electoral system is capable of achieving these aims:.
However desirable, it would be next to impossible to find an electoral system that is able to satisfy all of the points listed above. Nevertheless, these criteria do provide an objective scale which can facilitate comparison and evaluation of electoral systems. The lists can also serve as a means of sorting out competing, compelling, and sometimes confusing arguments made on behalf of the various systems.
Plurality and majoritarian systems offer several benefits. The first is their ability to produce single-party, majoritarian government. Indeed, research shows that single-party rule is more likely under plurality than under PR systems. Coalitions are less likely under this kind of electoral system and it could be argued that the governments formed as a result have a freer hand in enacting the policies on which they campaigned.
The single parties that form governments under the SMP system tend to hold legislative majorities. Nevertheless, SMP systems are not an absolute guarantee of majoritarian governments. It can be argued, furthermore, that majoritarian governments are not necessarily desirable. The propensity toward single party, majoritarian governments, may have an unexpected effect. Discouraged from electoral participation, small groups holding extreme positions may be prompted to resort to other than democratic means to advance their cause.
If, on the other hand, the electoral system allows such groups an opportunity for parliamentary representation, a measure of conformity with established rules is imposed upon them. A second major advantage of majoritarian systems is their relative simplicity in the eyes of the electorate. No complicated formula is involved, just the straightforward proposition that the candidate who gets the most votes wins.
There are those, however, who refute the alleged benefits of plurality and majoritarian systems. One analyst, using the means of analysis suggested above, writes that they:. The most prevalent argument is that representation is not well served by this kind of electoral system. Because majoritarian systems tend to distort outcomes by favouring strong parties and under-representing weaker ones, the wishes of most voters are often not reflected in electoral outcomes. Critics point out that this discredits the entire political system in the eyes of those it is meant to serve.
At the least, citizens become uninterested in political involvement, evidenced by declining turnout at elections; at worst, they use less passive means to show dissatisfaction, so that democracy is placed at serious risk. Since the party with the most votes generally wins more seats than its share of the popular vote would indicate, other parties are correspondingly disadvantaged by majoritarian electoral systems. As Canadian political scientist William P. Irvine explains,. The corollary is that, by exaggerating the strength of the government party, majoritarian systems produce weak, ineffective oppositions.
In large countries with dispersed populations, plurality systems tend to discriminate against parties whose support, though national, is thinly spread. Parties with a strong regional presence but little national support, tend, on the other hand to be rewarded. A majoritarian electoral system may thus be viewed as a divisive factor in a country with distinct regions, since parties have incentives in terms of electoral rewards to make strong regional appeals.
Those whose support is concentrated in one region, or who become champions of regional rather than national concerns, will be rewarded and regional cleavages will be consequently enhanced. Variants of majoritarian and plurality systems have attracted the following comments:. Single-member-plurality systems are considered by many to be superior in their representation of constituency interests.
In majoritarian and plurality systems that elect one representative per district there is a direct connection between elected representatives and electors.
There can be no ambiguity over who is responsible for a constituency's interests, unlike the case with PR systems where districts send more than one representative to the legislature.
These systems combine some of the advantages of PR and plurality systems by ensuring that not only do multiple points of view within a constituency gain legislative representation as is the case under PR , but also that those elected have significant levels of support from the electorate.
Because each district is represented by several members, however, the lines of responsibility between the elector and the elected are not always clear.
Single-member majoritarian systems, in contrast to SMP systems, are designed to ensure that elected representatives have the support of a full majority of the constituency's electors. A government elected under this system thereby enjoys enhanced legitimacy. An additional argument in favour of this kind of electoral system is its effect on extremist movements. Advocates claim that by favouring strong parties majoritarian systems discourage the emergence of extremist movements.
Evidence tends to confirm this claim. Lastly, under the two-ballot form of single-member majoritarian systems, voters need be less concerned about "wasting" their votes on the first ballot, since they know they will probably be given a second choice.
The principal argument advanced in favour of PR is its ability to reflect more accurately the preferences of voters in terms of seats in parliament. Voters are said to be more willing to cast votes for smaller parties when they know that their votes will produce tangible results, and when seats are allocated on the basis of the share of the popular vote.
The ability, in general, for PR systems to deliver seats to smaller parties encourages the formation of such parties, a factor which promises representation of a wider spectrum of public opinion. A closely related argument is that PR systems offer greater opportunities for legislative representation for minority groups and women. However, a recent Canadian Royal Commission on electoral reform pointed out that levels of women's representation in elected assemblies are often attributable to variables other than the electoral system, for example political parties' adoption of quotas for women candidates.
In this respect, the behaviour of political parties, especially in party-list PR systems, is crucial to women's ability to gain seats in elected assemblies. More careful analysis reveals that PR jurisdictions that do not use a quota system for women candidates have records similar to Canada's in this regard -- and sometimes worse. It is also claimed that, because minority views are not marginalized, political discourse and political participation are enlivened in PR systems.
The one reliable empirical indicator for this assertion, levels of voter turnout at elections, tends to confirm this. Arguments against PR, however, can be just as compelling as those in its favour. Some critics point out that PR systems encourage the emergence of extreme views, which, though quite often based on short-lived opinions of the day, are given a certain longevity and enhanced legitimacy through access to parliamentary representation.
This argument is best summed up by Irvine, who writes that under PR systems. They remain as available and plausible alternatives if regimes run into economic difficulties, and may be able to make difficult the functioning of a democratic regime.
PR systems are also criticized for the complexity of their balloting process and the way in which votes are tallied. Available information suggests that, while voter turnout may indeed be high in PR systems, ballot spoilage is also high, a possible sign of voter confusion when offered a multiplicity of choice.
Concerns are also expressed about the shape of the governments that result from PR electoral systems. Thus, when casting their ballots in a PR system, voters are not electing a government. Governments under PR are typically formed after elections, when parties attempt, through a bargaining process, to build governing coalitions. Voters, in effect, have little direct say regarding the complexion of their government. As well, coalition governments are viewed as less than stable. The bargaining among parties continues after the government-building process as various elements strive to have parts of their agenda adopted as official policy.
Compromise can be brokered, but negotiations often produce rifts that cannot be resolved. Consequently, unless there are changes in governing coalitions, the coalition will collapse, leading to new elections. It is on this basis that some have argued that coalition government is inherently unstable so that the electoral system that produces it is unsatisfactory. Critics also claim that, contrary to appearances, coalitions actually make it more difficult to change governments.
Coalition membership may fluctuate following elections, but the stronger members usually remain in place. Additional claims are made with respect to the advantages and disadvantages offered by specific forms of PR. Those who defend party list PR systems argue that political parties occupy an important place in any representative democracy and that the list system helps to ensure that the role of parties will be maintained and strengthened. On the other hand, parties acquire too much power when they can determine whose names will appear at the top of the lists.
Those elected on the basis of this system owe primary allegiance to their parties rather than to their electorates. Such concerns can be addressed by allowing voters to choose among lists or within lists.
Variants of the party list system that allow voters to chose either from among a party's candidates or between the candidates on several parties' lists allow voters a truer expression of their preferences.
These variants help ensure that the candidates with the strongest levels of support are elected; the legitimacy of the outcome is enhanced. If however, voter choice is restricted to the candidates from a single party, candidates will be encouraged to compete against members of their own party rather than those from rival formations.
This puts party cohesion at risk and makes the task of governing more difficult. Because STV, unlike party-list forms of PR, emphasizes the candidate rather than the party, it offers an advantage in that it " Critics of STV claim that it leads to weaker parties and hinders the emergence of a responsible party system because candidates work to attract personal support, sometimes at the expense of other candidates from their own party.
Experience in Australia has shown that when as many as fifty candidates can contest an election under an STV system, the process of counting the vote may be lengthy.
One type of voting system avoids such circular paradoxes entirely: proportional representation. Here a party is awarded a number of parliamentary seats in direct proportion to the number of people who voted for it. Such a system is undoubtedly fairer in a mathematical sense than either plurality or preferential voting, but it has political drawbacks.
It implies large, multi-representative constituencies; the best shot at truly proportional representation comes with just one constituency, the system used in Israel. But large constituencies weaken the link between voters and their representatives.
Candidates are often chosen from a centrally determined list, so voters have little or no control over who represents them. Editorial: Giving democracy a shot in the arm.
Proportional representation has its own mathematical wrinkles. There is no way, for example, to allocate a whole number of seats in exact proportion to a larger population. Such imperfections led the American economist Kenneth Arrow to list in the general attributes of an idealised fair voting system. He suggested that voters should be able to express a complete set of their preferences; no single voter should be allowed to dictate the outcome of the election; if every voter prefers one candidate to another, the final ranking should reflect that; and if a voter prefers one candidate to a second, introducing a third candidate should not reverse that preference.
All very sensible. In particular, there will always be the possibility that one voter, simply by changing their vote, can change the overall preference of the whole electorate. So we are left to make the best of a bad job. Some less fair systems produce governments with enough power to actually do things, though most voters may disapprove; some fairer systems spread power so thinly that any attempt at government descends into partisan infighting.
Crunching the numbers can help, but deciding which is the lesser of the two evils is ultimately a matter not for mathematics, but for human judgement. In , the chief clerk of the US Census Bureau, Charles Seaton, discovered that Alabama would get eight seats in a seat House, but only seven in a seat House.
The seats must, however, be shared among three states, Alabaska, Bolorado and Carofornia, with voting populations of 21, 13 and 5 million, respectively. Rounded down to an integer, this number of seats is given to the states. Any seats left over go to the state or states with the highest remainders. See the results. The rounded-down integers allocate three seats.
The fourth goes to Carofornia, the state with the largest remainder. Suppose now the number of seats increases from four to five. The quota is 39 million divided by 5, or 7.
The rounded-down integers account for three seats as before. The two spare go to Alabaska and Bolorado, which have the two largest remainders, and Carofornia loses its only seat.
The US Constitution stipulates that each state must have at least one representative, which would protect Carofornia in this case — the size of the House would have to be increased by one seat.
The precise conditions that lead to the Alabama paradox are mathematically complex. For three states they can be portrayed graphically, as in this diagram. The Alabama paradox occurs for the shaded population combinations: our example lies in the leftmost orange-shaded region. Such quirks mean that seats in proportional systems are now generally apportioned using algorithms known as divisor methods.
These work by dividing voting populations by a common factor so that when the fair proportions are rounded to a whole number they add up to the number of available seats. But this method is not foolproof: it sometimes gives a constituency more seats than the whole number closest to its fair proportion. The same can happen in a plurality system if the electoral arithmetic delivers a hung parliament, in which no party has an overall majority — as might happen in the UK after its election next week.
Where does the power reside in such situations? One way to quantify that question is the Banzhaf power index. For example, imagine a parliament of six seats in which party A has three seats, party B has two and party C has one. In the first two instances, both partners are swing partners. In the third instance, only A is — if either B or C dropped out, the remaining coalition would still have a majority.
Among the total of five swing partners in the three coalitions, A crops up three times and B and C once each. In a realistic situation, the calculations are more involved. This diagram shows how the power shifts dramatically when there is no majority in a hypothetical parliament of seats in which five voting blocs are represented. And the result is:.
Were they right? They explain their method — and its success or failure — in the 15 May issue of New Scientist. See the results The rounded-down integers allocate three seats. Trending Latest Video Free. Paralysed mice walk again after gel is injected into spinal cord New mineral davemaoite discovered inside a diamond from Earth's mantle How Minecraft is helping children with autism make new friends The surprising upsides of the prions behind horrifying brain diseases New COP26 draft text adds caveats to fossil fuel subsidies phase-out.
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